| ■36344 / ) |
「原則の分析論」Kant 的「序」！
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□投稿者/ pipit -(2024/01/31(Wed) 15:58:06)
| というわけで、
No36336-36337 へと読書続きます。
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序.超越論的な判断の能力一般について
もし悟性一般が、法則や規則の能力と定義されるなら、
判断の能力は規則のもとに包摂する能力と言えるだろう。
つまり、与えられた規則の下にそれがしたがうかしたがわないか（与えられた規則の事例かどうか）を判別する能力である。
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INTRODUCTION. Of the Transcendental Faculty of judgement in General
If understanding in general be defined as the faculty of laws or rules, the faculty of judgement may be termed the faculty of subsumption under these rules; that is, of distinguishing whether this or that does or does not stand under a given rule (casus datae legis). General logic contains no directions or precepts for the faculty of judgement, nor can it contain any such. For as it makes abstraction of all content of cognition, no duty is left for it, except that of exposing analytically the mere form of cognition in conceptions, judgements, and conclusions, and of thereby establishing formal rules for all exercise of the understanding. Now if this logic wished to give some general direction how we should subsume under these rules, that is, how we should distinguish whether this or that did or did not stand under them, this again could not be done otherwise than by means of a rule. But this rule, precisely because it is a rule, requires for itself direction from the faculty of judgement. Thus, it is evident that the understanding is capable of being instructed by rules, but that the judgement is a peculiar talent, which does not, and cannot require tuition, but only exercise. This faculty is therefore the specific quality of the so-called mother wit, the want of which no scholastic discipline can compensate.
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